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INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE ELICITATION OF QUANTILES
NICHOLAS M. KIEFER
Abstract. Incorporation of expert information in inference or decision settings
is often important, especially in cases where data are unavailable, costly or unreli-
able. One approach is to elicit prior quantiles from an expert and then to fit these
to a statistical distribution and proceed according to Bayes rule. Quantiles are
often thought to be easier to elicit than moments. An incentive-compatible elic-
itation method using an external randomization is available. Such a mechanism
will encourage the expert to exert the care necessary to report accurate informa-
tion. A second application might be called posterior elicitation. Here an analysis
has been done and the results must be reported to a decision maker. For a variety
of reasons (possibly including the reward system in the corporate hierarchy) the
modeler might need the right incentive system to report results accurately. Again,
eliciting posterior quantiles can be done with an incentive compatible mechanism.
MSC 2000 Subject classification, Primary: 62C10; secondary 91B06
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1. Introduction
Incorporation of prior information is important in any decision or inference set-
ting, whether it is done formally or informally. The formal Bayesian approach
encourages transparency in assumptions, clear thinking and coherence. One ex-
ample is risk management in financial institutions in which prudent management
requires understanding default probabilities for groups of homogeneous assets. In
the case of new types of assets there may not be enough data information to support
a practical conventional estimator, for example the frequency estimator in the case
of binomial defaults. Zero is not an estimated default probability that is acceptable
to regulators. This issue has attracted regulatory and industry as well as academic
attention, see Kiefer (2009), and references given there. Kiefer (2010) proposes elic-
iting prior quantiles for an expert’s prior on the value of the default probability for
a particular group of assets. For example, the median can be assessed by asking
the expert at what value of a default rate θ would he be equally surprised to see a
realization above or below θ. These quantiles (perhaps after feedback and revision)
are assembled into a distribution, either by fitting a specific functional form or as
proposed by Kiefer (2010) fit to a smoothed maximum-entropy distribution. The
idea is to impose as little information as possible beyond that elicited from the ex-
pert. This distribution is then used to process data information through Bayes rule
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and the likelihood function. The latter is itself typically a representation of a large
number of probabilities in terms of a few parameters, so the statistical treatment
and the approximations involved are the same in the prior and the likelihood.
Other examples of elicitation of quantiles and their use to form a prior distribution
are cited in O’Hagan, Buck, Daneshkhah, Eiser, Garthwaite, Jenkinson, Oakley, and Rakow
(2006) and include applications to drug testing, sales of engines, the effect of nuclear
waste on temperature, and future earnings. A discussion of the statistical and psy-
chological issues involved in elicitation is Garthwaite, Kadane, and O’Hagan (2005).
These issues are not reviewed here. The incentive compatibility question does not
seem to have been stressed.
A second application is eliciting accurate assessments from a modeling group
within an organization. Here, the risks and rewards to proper reporting incentives
are clear. In banks, risk modelers are required by regulators to report to senior
management, not to business line management. In other institutions the separa-
tion between incentives for modelers and those acting on the results might be less
clear. Senior management may choose to put in place incentive compatible reporting
mechanisms. Regulators may question the compensation plan for modelers.
Finally, reporting of financial forecasts and results to counterparties and regula-
tors should be as accurate as possible. Here too, incentive-compatible mechanisms
might play a role.
The difficult part is the elicitation of the quantiles, which requires thought and
therefore some effort from the expert in our first example (the expert must have the
incentive to provide this effort) and simply rewards for accuracy in the second. Since
the quantiles can never be observed, and therefore the assessment checked, there is
an issue of providing an incentive for the expert to provide the required thought.
The problem of eliciting probabilities for given sets is well-studied and a widely-used
approach is scoring. The scoring method does not naturally extend to the quan-
tile assessment problem, as shown in Section 2. Savage (1971) reviews techniques
for assessing probabilities and notes an interesting interpretation of probabilities
as prices. He notes that the device of outside randomization, used by Marschak
(1964) to compel a true valuation for a bid or asked price applies also to probability
assessment. An ingenious recent method due to Karni (2009) introduces a second
outside source of randomness to eliminate possible effects of risk aversion. This
method does extend naturally to eliciting quantiles as shown in Section 2 with a
different development than that of Marschak or Karni. Section 3 concludes.
2. Eliciting Probabilities and Quantiles
Assume at the outset that the expert’s information about the unknown quantity θ
is coherent, that is that it can be described by a probability distribution. Classical
discussions of the necessity of describing uncertainty in terms of probability are
Savage (1954), De Finetti (1974), and Lindley (1982). We do not review these well-
known demonstrations and simply assume that the expert’s information is described
in a probability distribution with cdf F (θ) and pdf f(θ). We wish to elicit the
probability α quantile qα with F (qα) = α. Assume that f(qα) > 0 so that the
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quantile is well-defined. Assume for convenience that Supp(f) ⊆ [0, 1]. This is
natural when the uncertain quantity θ is a default probability; in other cases a
parameter transformation may be appropriate. The method of scoring for eliciting
the probability β associated with a given set, say [0, q], rewards the expert with
(1) r(β|q) = (I(θ ∈ [0, q])g1(β) + (1− I(θ ∈ [0, q])g0(β)
where I() is the indicator function g1(β) is a nondecreasing function, g0(β) is a
nonincreasing function and β is the elicited probability, after the single realization
of θ is seen. The scoring rule is proper if the expectation Er(β|q) = F (q)g1(β) +
(1− F (q))g0(β) is maximized at β = qα (some applications minimize instead). The
optimal choice of β for a risk-neutral expert rewarded by a proper scoring rule
is F (q). A classical example of a proper scoring rule has g1(β) = (1 − β)
2 and
g0(β) = −β
2 in which case the first-order condition for maximizing Er(β|q) implies
F (q)/(1− F (q)) = β/(1− β).
Scoring rules for probabilities have been widely studied. A classical application is
the assessment of the quality of weather forecasts. Most of the literature does not
consider scoring for probability assessment, rather for estimation when the score is
an objective function or for measuring the accuracy of assessments already arrived
at, or for evaluating the fit of statistical models. Thus, most of the literature does
not consider risk aversion and its effects on probability assessment, although the
issue is well known, see Savage (1971) or for a general treatment that also considers
the effects of state preference (a very difficult problem) Kadane and Winkler (1988).
Schervish (1989) provides a characterization of the class of proper scoring rules for
probabilities. It is clear from (1) that scoring rules need not be symmetric. Winkler
(1994) argues that in forecasting a short-horizon weather event the maximum score
should not occur at probability 0.5 as with symmetric scores but at the long-run
event probability, reflecting maximum uncertainty. This argument may also be rel-
evant for assessing financial risks. Scoring the assessment of the probability of a
binary event can be readily extended to scoring the assessment of a full probability
distribution. A simple device is to calculate the score for a distribution assessment
by choosing an interval randomly and scoring the probability implied by the as-
sessed distribution using a scoring rule for a binary event. Matheson and Winkler
(1976) propose a score that integrates over the random interval with a weight-
ing function emphasizing more important parts of the distribution being assessed.
Scoring rules for probabilities can be related to information measures and utilities,
see Jose, Nau, and Winkler (2008). Proper scoring rules typically do not lead to
accurate assessments in the presence of risk aversion.
With u(x) the utility of a payoff x the expected utility associated with the scoring
rule (1) is
Eu(r(β|q)) = F (q)u(g1(β)) + (1− F (q))u(g0(β))
and the expected-utility maximizing choice of β is not typically F (q) when u
is nonlinear. In the quadratic case for example the first-order condition implies
F (q)/(1−F (q)) = u′(−β2)β/(u′((1−β)2)(1−β)). Karni (2009) provides a method
for eliciting probabilities that works in the presence of risk aversion. That method
extends to quantile elicitation.
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There is far less work on quantile scoring. Fixing β and using (1) to elicit the
quantile q does not work even without risk aversion as the optimal choice of q is 0
for g0(β) ≥ g1(β) and 1 for g0(β) ≤ g1(β). Gneiting and Raftery (2007) note that
w(q; β) = βs(q) + (s(θ)− s(q))1{θ ≤ q}+ h(θ) for s nondecreasing and h arbitrary
gives a proper scoring rule for quantiles. They note that the characterization of the
full class of proper scoring rules for quantiles remains open. We give a simple proof
for differentiable and increasing s.
Theorem 1. w(q|β) = βs(q)+(s(θ)−s(q))1{θ ≤ q}+h(θ) with s() increasing and
h() arbitrary is a proper scoring rule for the βth quantile q.
Proof. Eθw(q|β) = βs(q)+
∫ q
0
(s(θ)−s(q))dF +
∫
1
0
h(θ)dF. The first order condition
is βs′(q)− F (q)s′(q) = 0, hence the optimal q satisfies F (q) = β. 
A widely used rule in econometrics (for estimation and goodness of fit assessment,
not for eliciation) is w(q|β) = (θ − q)(1{θ ≤ q} − β). This scoring rule, with
s(q) = q, is behind most work in quantile estimation, see Koenker and Bassett
(1978) and Koenker and Machado (1999). With risk aversion, proper scoring rules
for quantiles need not elicit the true quantiles.
3. A New Method for Quantile Elicitation
The new method based on outside randomness works as follows. Suppose the
elicitor wishes qa. The elicitor has access to a genie which generates a random vari-
able ξ from the uniform distribution on [0, 1] and independently a random variable
d ∈ {0, 1} from the Bernoulli with probability α. The expert supplies a value q for
the α − th quantile. Nature supplies one realization of θ. The expert receives a
reward equal to rI(θ ∈ [0, ξ]) if q < ξ and rd if q ≥ ξ. The expert’s utility of a
payoff x is u(x).
It is the random variable ξ which leads to true revelation in the risk neutral case
and the Bernoulli d which allows for risk aversion. To develop intuition, consider
the method with d replaced by its expectation α.Then the reward from 4) upon
observing θ is
v(q|ξ, θ) = u(r)I(θ ∈ [0, ξ])I(q < ξ) + u(rα)I(q ≥ ξ))
(normalizing u(0) = 0). Marginalizing wrt θ and then ξ leads to
v(q) = u(r)
∫
1
q
F (t)dt+ u(rα)q
and the FOC u(r)(−F (q)) + u(rα) leads to q = qα when utility is linear but not
otherwise.
Now suppose the rv d is supplied along with ξ. Then
v(q|ξ, d) = u(r)F (ξ)I(q < ξ) + u(rd)I(q ≥ ξ)
and marginalizing wrt d gives
v(q|ξ) = u(r)F (ξ)I(q < ξ) + u(r)I(q ≥ ξ)α.
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The FOC implies F (q) = α, so revelation is optimal with risk aversion. The random
variable d supplied by the genie essentially moves the expectation through the utility
function. In short:
Theorem 2. With the reward described above the optimal policy for the expert is
to report the true quantile.
Proof. Consider the expected utility to the expert of supplying q. First, suppose the
genie supplies ξ to the expert. Marginalizing wrt θ and d gives the expected utility
v(q|ξ) = u(r)(F (ξ)I(q < ξ) + F (qα)I(q ≥ ξ))
piecewise constant with a break at ξ. Marginalizing with respect to the uniform
random variable ξ yields the unconditional expected utility function
v(q) = u(r)(
∫
1
q
F (t)dt+ F (qα)q)
The first-order condition is v′(q) = u(r)(−F (q) + F (qα)) = 0 and the function is
concave, so the optimal policy for the expert is to report the true quantile. 
An alternative proof from a decision-theoretic point of view and using lotteries
can be given. This proof uses preferences over lotteries but does not require the full
expected utility framework. Let (x, p) ∈ R × [0, 1] denote the lottery that pays $x
with probability p and $0 with probability (1− p). The expert payoff is (r, F (ξ)) if
ξ > q and (r, α) if ξ ≤ q. Consider the report q > qα. If ξ > q then the expert’s
payoff is (r, F (ξ)) whether he reports q or qα. If ξ ≤ qα then the expert’s payoff is
(r, α) whether he reports q or qα. If qα < ξ < q then the expert’s payoff is (r, α).
However, had he reported qα instead, his reward would have been (r, F (ξ)) . But
F (ξ) > α hence (r, F (ξ)) first-order stochastically dominates (r, α) so the expert
cannot win and may lose as a result of reporting q > qα.Similarly, reporting q < qα
is dominated.
4. Conclusion
The classical elicitation problem concerns eliciting probabilities for given events.
This paper studies the complementary problem of eliciting events for given prob-
abilities. This is the problem involved in obtaining prior quantiles. Although the
reward r does not affect the optimality condition, it is clear that the actual effort
expended by the expert will depend on the value of the reward (precisely, on its
utility). Perhaps some part of a bonus could be tied into the probability assessment.
Interesting open questions include: Which quantiles and how many should be as-
sessed? How much accuracy can be expected in a quantile assessment? Can experts
be trained to improve their assessments? How can prior quantiles be assessed from
a group of experts?
References
De Finetti, B. (1974): Theory of Probability, Volume 1. New York: Wiley.
6 NICHOLAS M. KIEFER
Garthwaite, P. H., J. B. Kadane, and A. O’Hagan (2005): “Statistical
Methods for Eliciting Probability Distributions,” Journal of the American Sta-
tistical Association, 100, 780–700.
Gneiting, T., and A. E. Raftery (2007): “Strictly Proper Scoring Rules,
Prediction, and Estimation,” Journal of the American Statistical Association,
102(477), 359–378.
Jose, V., R. Nau, and R. Winkler (2008): “Scoring Rules, Generalized En-
tropy, and Utility Maximization,” Operations Research, 56(5), 1146–1157.
Kadane, J. B., and R. L. Winkler (1988): “Separating Probability Elicitation
From Utilities,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 83(402), 357–
363.
Karni, E. (2009): “A Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilities,” Econometrica, 77(2),
603–606.
Kiefer, N. M. (2009): “Default Estimation for Low Default Portfolios,” Journal
of Empirical Finance, 16, 164–173.
Kiefer, N. M. (2010): “Default Estimation and Expert Information,” Journal of
Business and Economic Statistics, 28(2), 320–328.
Koenker, R., and J. Bassett, Gilbert (1978): “Regression Quantiles,” Econo-
metrica, 46(1), 33–50.
Koenker, R., and J. A. F. Machado (1999): “Goodness of Fit and Related
Inference Processes for Quantile Regression,” Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 94(448), 1296–1310.
Lindley, D. V. (1982): “Scoring Rules and the Inevitability of Probability,” In-
ternational Statistical Review / Revue Internationale de Statistique, 50(1), 1–11.
Marschak, J. (1964): “Actual versus Consistent Decision Behavior,” Behavioral
Science, 9, 103–110.
Matheson, J. E., and R. L. Winkler (1976): “Scoring Rules for Continuous
Probability Distributions,” Management Science, 22, 1087–1096.
O’Hagan, A., C. E. Buck, A. Daneshkhah, J. R. Eiser, P. Garthwaite,
D. J. Jenkinson, J. E. Oakley, and T. Rakow (2006): Uncertain Judge-
ments: Eliciting Experts’ Probabilities. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
Savage, L. J. (1954): Foundations of Statistics. New York: Wiley.
Savage, L. J. (1971): “Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations,”
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 66, 783–801.
Schervish, M. J. (1989): “A General Method for Comparing Probability Asses-
sors,” The Annals of Statistics, 17(4), 1856–1879.
Winkler, R. L. (1994): “Evaluating Probabilities: Asymmetric Scoring Rules,”
Management Science, 40(11), 1395–1405.
